Many public controversies involve the assessment of statements about which we have imperfect information. Without a structured approach, it is quite difficult to develop an approach to reasoning which is not based on ad hoc choices. Forms of logic have been used in the past to try to bring such clarity, but these fail for a variety of reasons. We demonstrate a simple approach to bringing a standardized approach to semantics, in uncertain discourse, using Promise Theory. As a case, we use Promise Theory (PT) to collect and structure publicly available information about the case of the MCAS software component for the Boeing 737 Max flight control system. *
Introduction
The tragic crashes of two Boeing 737 Max aircraft led to the grounding of the worldwide fleet and an extensive investigation into the causes. The flight safety of the aircraft design, including its software, has been called into question, centering on a software component known as the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS).
In this paper, we present some initial considerations concerning the discussion surrounding the ways in which faults and flaws may have entered the aircraft's human-machine system 1 . Software engineering safety, in particular, is a subject in rapid flux, given the pace of software development. It began, in earnest, with the informal definition of failure modes [2] , and was extended principally through discussions of specific technologies and their security properties. More recently, methodology concerning 'post-mortem analysis' of incidents and systemic learning has been developed [3] [4] [5] . More generally, system safetywith an emphasis on flight safety-has a long history and an extensive literature (see for example [6] [7] [8] [9] ), and has been related to the wider concept of systematic stability [1, 10, 11] , but the tools of analysis are largely informal and heuristic, so there is considerable room for more constrained languages for analytic reasoning. Introducing some aspects of Promise Theory as a tool for such analysis is one goal of this work.
Software plays a role in nearly all complex systems today. Increasingly, the focus rests on 'algorithms'where the term 'algorithm' enshrines a bundle of design decisions on how a system is supposed to react under certain conditions. An algorithm is (perhaps boldly and certainly informally) said to 'determine' the decisions made by the system in different circumstances; but algorithms are logical trees of possible pathways-they may also make use of data gathered in real time or from experience, by learning techniques. We will return to the notion of an algorithm in the concluding section.
The suggestion of determinism therefore overstates the capabilities of algorithms. All we can really say is that their promises influence outcomes in some fashion. The more recent discussions concerning the use of machine learning, say for self-driving vehicles [12, 13] , illustrates how there is often a mismatch of complexities in reliance in software algorithms. When notable failures occur, certain system components, including software components, may become the subject of intense public debates, conducted at a high level of abstraction, and thus far removed from technical realities.
In this work, we base our analysis on the following assumptions:
• Algorithms, and the software components realizing them, are subjects for public deliberation, reflection, and scrutiny. We refer to this as the external assessment of algorithms and software components.
• The language and notations of computer science, and of engineering, are often too technical and too detailed for use by the public at large, i.e. for informal external assessments. Moreover, the strict forms of logic are unhelpful in analyzing problems of non-trivial complexity. Some middle ground is helpful.
• Promise Theory is a useful tool for the assessment of algorithms and software components, because it offers a semi-formal approach based on a clear model of interaction, with a decade of experience and application [1, 11] . It's our goal to pursue this avenue through the Boeing case study.
Promise Theory was originally conceived as an approach to modelling in agent-based systems, i.e. in systems composed from independent components, as networks, from the bottom up. PT exposes the role of agent interactions, both semantically and dynamically. Although originally applied in the context of distributed computer systems, the method is general and has since been applied at larger scales and even social and political contexts. It includes the possibility of interactions between human and non-human agents, and the effects of the fidelity with which agents are able to keep promises that may be offered at varying levels of precision [14] .
Promise Theory breaks the world broadly into agents, promises, and assessments. An agent may be any separable entity, i.e. one that has the capacity to inject independent causal information to the system. A promise is a statement of intent, and can be made by single agents or by groups of agents (superagents). Promises typically fall into two types: behaviours offered (sometimes called + promises) and behaviours accepted (sometimes called -promises). The description of what constitutes a promise may be specified in any language, in principle, but the more precise an offer is made, the easier it is for it to be accepted and assessed. An assessment, on the other hand, is a statement of the belief made by an agent about whether a promise (made by any other agent, or itself) has been kept or not. By breaking a system down into these parts, PT offers a surprisingly clear picture of system completeness, which is not dogged the excessive constraints of formal logics.
In this work we try to find an appropriate scale and language for describing the human-machine collaboration involved in a flight system: promises are used to inform agents at all levels: machine to machine, machine to human, human to machine, and system to external observers, who may be either technical or non-technical. We focus on the catastrophic losses of two Boeing 737 Max flights as a case study, and we develop a promise theoretic analysis suitable for an external assessment of the MCAS component of Boeing 737 Max flight control software. External assessments may range from design choices to implementation artifacts, and their roles during flights. This should include the concept of ongoing development, including updates to components, which is common in software engineering in particular.
Promise Theory and modes of application
Promise Theory can be used in a variety of ways. In this paper we use it as a tool for structuring information, in the public discussion, which has mainly concerned the requirements of certain software components. Lacking the undisclosed 'inside information' of the investigation, as most commentators do, we must be careful not to make unsubstantiated claims. PT is helpful, nevertheless, in sorting out claims and context where varied assessments comes into play.
The first hint that PT can be useful is the following inequality in treatment of systems. The term 'system requirements' is most commonly used in engineering methodology when complicated machinery and human systems are discussed and designed, In other words, requirements and expectations are imposed rather than stating what tolerances the resulting implementations are able to deliver. This focus on requirement is supposed to ensure their fitness for purpose. By contrast, simpler off-the-shelf components are described by their tolerances (effectively stating the limits of what they promise, rather than what an independent party requires of them).
According to Promise Theory, requirements have the status of 'impositions'-i.e. an external pressure exerted on a system or its builders to accept and implement certain directives and to promises commensurate with them in response. Multiple requirements, i.e. multiple impositions can be inconsistent and lead to uncertainty, so it's always better to flip the discussion around to what promises components can make independently, and then study the interactions of those promises [14] . That will be our strategy here. Regardless of the process used to form expectations about the behaviour of system components, we choose to draw attention to what they are able to promise, rather than what others may seek to require of them.
In order to illustrate and clarify the available degrees of freedom when working with PT, we distinguish five modes of application:
Political strategy level (PAL). PT used to express long term policies, independent of individual action or preference. Here promisers and promisees are humans.
Tactical political level (PAL). PT used to discuss the behaviour of individuals and groups in elation to specific objectives. Here promisers and promisees are humans and social groups.
Software requirements assessment level (SRAL) PT used to discuss and reflect on the role that software components play in a specific context, for instance whether or not a specific software com-ponent, say in control of the aircraft, allows enough Meaningful Human Control (MHC), see for instance [15, 16] and [17] ) over the actions of the total system.
Technical interaction theory level (PAL) PT used as a framework for the description and development of theoretical accounts of multi-agent systems (e.g. [18] ).
Software technology level (PAL). PT is used to specify the intended behaviour of software components 2 .
Generally speaking, promises explain the envelope of system behaviour, in the form of pre-specified outcomes and language-applied to the many software components and combinations inside systems. The great bonus of using PT is that it can easily unify the roles of different kinds of agent-both human and non-human-in a single framework.
A litany of explicit and supposed promises by agents involved
We begin without further delay to describe some of the promises made by the Boeing aircraft system and its manufacturer. The key promises set the scene, principally from the perspective of each promiser. Here they form the basis on which to asses the MCAS software component. Each promise has the following structure:
where the body of the promise represents an explication of the intended outcome, and the scope is a list of agents who are privy to the promise between the promiser and promisee.
The main agents referred to
Agents will be written in bold face, and include:
• Boeing management (Boeing)
• Airline management
• Pilots
• FAA, i.e. the Federal Aviation Authority.
• Authors, i.e. us.
• Public, i.e. the audience for public discourse.
• Ralph Nader, political activist and consumer advocate.
• W. Bradley Wendel Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, Cornell University.
• Peter Ladkin Professor of Computer Networks and Distributed Systems in the Faculty of Technology at the University of Bielefeld.
• Benno Baksteen Captain and former president of the Dutch Airline Pilots' Association.
• DO178c Software Engineering standards. 2 Promise Theory emerged from the study of stability and formal correctness of system states in computer installations as a deviation from the over-constraints of logical reasoning towards network processes [19] [20] [21] [22] . 
Boeing as the promiser
Three promises from Boeing's side communicate an awareness of what is at stake. The most central and stark promise was that of continuity in system behaviour between the longstanding 737 and the revitalized 737 Max. (iii) Even if it is detected that the Angle of Attack (AoA) sensors disagree, that information need not be communicated as a warning to the pilots (although this warning signal can be bought at additional costs). For Pilots who do not know of the existence of MCAS such information is of no use, and increases the risk of information overload in the cockpit.
END PROMISE
Item (iii) above is confirmed in [23] where it is considered a plausible design decision, and is mentioned in [24] where it is considered an implausible design decision.
Promise 3.3 (Non-antistall promise)
Boeing to FAA (no-one else in scope):
PROMISE BODY:
(i) MCAS is merely installed in order to have the same flight experience for pilots, (ii) MCAS is not meant to prevent stalling or any other potential calamitous emergency which has become more probable in the B737 Max compared with the B737 NG because of aerodynamic differences (which result from different size and placement of the engines).
(iii) MCAS is based on existing technology that is properly working in the Boeing KC-46 Pegasus tanker plane, which is a further development of a Boeing 767 cc).
END PROMISE
We might note that such a promise may immediately be suspected as a deception, since promising that the addition of a software component meant to counter the effects of mechanical changes would have no effect on stalling is implausible in and of itself.
Authors as promisers
The following are some promises that we, the authors, provide for the benefit of the reader (you), for context and reference. The promises in this section are of general methodological interest as a reasoning tool. They point to one advantage of PT over a precise logical argument, and over free rhetoric: without PT, when stating the promise bodies as factual information, there is a need to find evidence in support of the assertions. Logical statements should be considered true or false-perhaps with some probability. Remarkably, with promises, one can do without providing evidence, as long as the claims are not beyond reason, because the implicit semantics are sufficient for the purpose of establishing a the positions semantically. This is in contrast to logical approaches, where actual evidential inputs are needed to establish branch points in an argument, else one faces an exponential growth of brittle and mutually exclusive possibilities. With PT, on the other hand, a reader who disagrees with an agent's promises (e.g. is able to find a convincing rationale for the existence of a software component MCAS-p in the Boeing KC-46 Pegasus) could simply decrease their trust in that agent-as you, the reader, might decide that we-the authors of this document-are untrustworthy, if we should make promises that violate your perceived trust. Indeed, this is generally true-we may have failed to find crucial evidence, which we accept, but that is not a reason to abstain from trying to make sense of what we can discover. Others may offer flawed evidence, which could lead to more trust than is warranted. (iii) It is implausible that MCAS-p only serves to create a look and feel for pilots which conforms to a type which they have been flying before (as mentioned above).
(iv) It is hard to find out (and we did not succeed in determining) which objectives of MCAS-p have been preserved as the objectives of MCAS, which objectives were dropped, and which new objectives were assigned to MCAS w.r.t. MCAS-p.
END PROMISE
Promise 3.5 Authors to Public readers (i.e. Public in scope).
PROMISE BODY:
The B737 Max problem may be considered a software problem, if only because its solution (according to Boeing) consists of an upgrade of the MCAS software component.
END PROMISE
Promise 3.6 Authors to Public readers (i.e. Public in scope).
PROMISE BODY:
The B737 Max software problem may be considered an instance of feature interaction, i.e. promises that are conditional on one another (See e.g. [25] for the concept of feature interactions.)
END PROMISE
To justify promise 3.6 we mention that the following features interacted during the calamitous events:
1. Repeated automatic stabilizer downwards trimming upon detection of excessive angle of attack, and independently of pilot's attempts to override the stabilizer trimming commands. This situation was described in detail w.r.t. the Lion Air crash in [26] (a key feature introduced after the Airbus earlier 330 crash over the Atlantic, where it became clear that pilot's failed to believe that the aircraft was at risk to enter a stall. This suggestion has been put forward in detail in [23] .).
2.
The immediate predecessor aircraft model (737 NG) allows Pilots to counteract runaway trim 3 via yoke handling (although the flight manual instructs not to do so, and instead proposes (i) apply the manual switch off of the electric motors which move the trim, and (ii) thereafter use manual control until safe landing, (while 737 Max 8 technically only allows the second solution of a trim runaway).
(The 737 Max design made it a feature that the instructions in the flight manual were the unique and only way to solve the problem. Thereby a parasitic feature, inherited from the 737 NG, was overridden and the need for training to undo habits that contradicted flight manual prescriptions went undetected. Recent information suggests that not following flight manuals is still standard practice to date. See [23] for more detail.)
3. MCAS is triggered (to change the stabilizer position by several degrees, in order to make the aircraft turn in a downward direction) by a single AOA sensor, even though a second AOA sensor produces highly deviating values, and even if the system has observed that AOA measurements have become unreliable 4 .
(This might be arguably ok in terms of probability calculus, and even preferable to voting with two AOA sensors, as long as the risk of trimming the stabilizer when that is not required was negligible, that is when trigger by a faulty AOA sensor is manageable. However, it exposed a critical failure path.)
4. If runaway trim is detected too late and the move towards fully manual flying has been made, it may be too heavy going for the pilots to use the manual stabilizer control in order to counteract the trim runaway.
(Acquiring effective manual control is not so easy as might be expected. Those pilots who have had hands on experience with manual control in the 737 NG under demanding circumstances found that effectuating manual control became slightly harder in the 737 Max. Indeed manual stabilizer controls now have a slightly smaller radius than in the predecessor model, a feature which saves cockpit space, but which may require more human power and which for that reason may be problematic at higher speeds. High speed is likely to occur after a stabilizer runaway has been detected and reacted upon late.)
5.
Hiding from the pilots the information that both AOA sensors disagree (a feature intended to avoid cognitive overload, in a critical phase, was justified by the observation that the AOA is not a quantity on which the human control of a commercial airliner is based nowadays).
(In the 737 Max case, knowing that AOA sensors diverge in their readings, and that AOA measurement is unreliable for that reason is of no help whatsoever for the Pilots, unless the Pilots know that this may negatively impact on MCAS behaviour. Therefore suppressing this information was deemed a reasonable feature in the light of information overload prevention.)
6. The role of simulators has been complex. Simulator tests during development missed the scenario of the Lion Air accident, which upon retrospectively analyzing the accident could be replicated and led to the conclusion that repeated MCAS interventions in addition to other warnings indirectly caused by AOA disagreement increased the workload for the Pilots too much (see [28] ). Simulator tests after redesign of the B737 Max has shown anew complications which too months to resolve (see [29] ). B737 Max Pilots had only been using B737 NG simulators for training which don't contain the MCAS software, or an appropriate abstraction of it. B737 Max simulators exist, but without MCAS simulation. 5 Authors to Public readers (Public in scope).
PROMISE BODY:
(i) By a hypothetical B737 Max-minus, let us imagine an aircraft B737 Max without MCAS, i.e the airplane B737 Max modified in such a manner that "AOA too high" alerts are not processed, so that no interventions from MCAS may occur.
(ii) From the publicly available literature one cannot infer whether or not B737 Max-minus can be certified as a new type of aircraft. However, promise 3.3 suggests that this would indeed be possible.
(iii) It is an open theoretical problem whether or not a software component MCASb exists (in a mathematical sense, i.e. can be designed) which transforms B737 Max-minus, which is referred to as the unaugmented B737 Max [30] by including MCASb, to an aircraft B737 Max (MCASb) which can be successfully certified as an airplane of the same type as B737 NG. This problem is decidable, in principle, by assuming that an airframe will be used not more that a predetermined maximum of hours, and that it suffices to recompute all desired outputs, say every millisecond. Authors to Public readers (public in scope):
(i) If it turns out to be the case that MCAS-p (see promise 3.4) has been designed as an anti-stall system, then the use of input from a single AOA sensor is only plausible (in hindsight).
(ii) If MCAS results from a natural evolution of predecessor MCAS-p, then the use of a single AOA sensor output is plausible in hindsight (while at the same time it indicates a mismatch between high level requirement of making the B737 Max fly like a B737 NG, and low level requirements i.e. inheriting anti-stall functionality from MCAS-p.
END PROMISE
This concludes the assertions that we infer from literature surrounding the incident. Readers should assess each of these promised statements in the light of their possibly greater access to information.
Other external observers as promisers
Finally, conducive to the argument of software flaws, let us consider some more points. (i) There is no problem with B737 Max at this moment (March 13 2019) [31] .
(ii) The step to ground B737 Max aircraft in China is overly cautious and is not well-founded in facts.
END PROMISE
Our assessment: this promise turned out to be impossible to keep upright, and thereby sets and end to the trust we have in Benno Baksteen as an aviation safety expert. Promise 3.10 (MCAS is a patch which provides stability and anti stall protection).
Ralph Nader to Public (all Public in scope):
PROMISE BODY:
(i) MCAS is a software patch which compensates for aerodynamic design problems (labelled as instability).
(ii) These difficulties should have been solved by airframe design and not by means of a software patch, i.e. a mechanical solution to a mechanical problem.
END PROMISE
This promise we construct as made by Nader from the following quote [32] :
'And the light at the end of the tunnel is not trying to use a hoked-up, glitch-ridden software in the cockpit-MCAS, it's called. A software fix for hardware defect? You've got to recall the planes, and Boeing has got to develop engineering adjustments and engineering changes so that plane is not prone to stall, which is, of course, what led to the crashes in Indonesia and Ethiopia, killing of 346 innocent people. That's where it's got to be now.'
This promise seems to build on the following implicit promise, which we infer (by imputing from the quote): Existing B737 Max planes are best taken back by Boeing for adjustment so as to work well without an additional software patch.
This promise is implicit in the same quote and it seems to presuppose the following promise: Promise 3.13 Ralph Nader to Public:
PROMISE BODY:
As an expert in building airplanes I can assure you that it is possible to fix the airframe, by way of aerodynamically relevant adjustments in such a manner that no additional control software component (like MCAS) will be needed.
END PROMISE
How one assesses Nader's comments here, in the form of promises, is of significance to his credibility as a commentator-just as our comments above are about us. Assessing them as incorrect could suggest that Nader's objective was to create reputational damage for Boeing rather than to offer a safe solution to the flight control issue. Remarks by law professor W. Bradley Wendel, which we paraphrase from [23] is more accommodating to possible solutions: 
PROMISE BODY:
If one contemplates holding Boeing accountable for the problematic design of B737 Max aircraft, then the best approach would be to propose a Rational Alternative Design (RAD)that is a design modification which has the following properties: (i) when implemented it prevents the problems which have occurred from occurring, (ii) the alternative can be proposed by persons with ordinary professional knowledge, (iii) the alternative functions properly in all relevant circumstances. Rational Alternative Design (RAD) requires that both AOA sensors agree when triggering MCAS in an intervention (thereby avoiding that the single AOA sensor operates as a Single Point of Failure).
END PROMISE
For this matter see [23] . As a side comment, we mention that [23] takes it for granted that MCAS primarily provides anti-stall protection (which is in contrast with promise 3.3). That being the case (hypothetically) a false negative (failing to see that the AOA has become too high) presents a high risk. Now requiring that both AOA sensors agree increases the probability of false negatives. This observation has lead us to promise 3.8 above.
Software commentator P. Ladkin takes issue with the assertion of anti-stall intent, and indicates that he has no conclusive evidence that software engineers made relevant mistakes, mainly because spotting system design flaws is not their responsibility [33] . 
PROMISE BODY:
Even if a software update solves the B737 Max problems, there is no reason to assume that the original software engineers made mistakes.
END PROMISE
Ladkin points to an issue which is central to the matter: only once it is known what the software component is supposed to achieve in principle its engineering can be criticized.
Secondary promises (by Boeing, FAA)
Boeing issued a communication to the press which indicated direction in which the problems would be solved. 
PROMISE BODY:
Some improvements and adjustments will be made (leaving the airframe unchanged) on the design in order to have it once more certified (with in the same type as the B737 NG):
(i) There will be a warning for the pilots if AOA (angle of attack) sensors disagree (beyond 5.5 degrees).
(ii) Upon detection of a AOA disagreement MCAS-next will be deactivated, and at the same time pilots must work with manual control.
(iii) MCAS-next will not repeat its interventions.
(iv) MCAS-next will take notice of pilot actions and repeated attempts to overrule MCAS interventions will be successful.
END PROMISE
The final promise of software learning the pilots' behaviours throws up new warning flags from a design perspective-namely, the extent to which Pilots can rely on software or hardware control then becomes completely unknown. (Notice that the expectation of certification by a deadline is an imposition, which is likely without merit.) (ii) A high level simulator is available and in this simulator the improved B737 Max design passes all relevant tests.
Promise 4.3 From FAA to Boeing (Public in scope):
PROMISE BODY:
Certification of the improved B737 Max will not take place during 2019, and the timing of this action is entirely up to the FAA.
END PROMISE
For an outsider comment on the the latter promise we mention [34] .
Secondary promises by the authors
Let us try to capture part of 'what went wrong', using a bundle of promises. By using promises explicitly, readers may know clearly our intended meaning, whereas in looser narrative form the points might be dismissed as rhetoric. None of what follows should be read as a claim that Boeing engineers were sloppy or negligent. Their engineering challenge was spectacular, though perhaps more so in hindsight than at the time of B737 Max flight control software design. Indeed, it may be fairly difficult to find out when and where in the development process steps were taken which could be qualified as defective or problematic. We assume, in the following, that the B737 Max design is (at least to some extent) responsible for both accidents, granted any claims that pilot errors, maintenance problems, and training deficiencies may have been in place as well. This seems fair, since one must assess the total system and the fidelity of all agents in keeping their component promises in promising the outcome of the whole [1] .
Promise 5.1 (Learning curve risks persist)
Authors to Public.
PROMISE BODY:
(i) Both catastrophes will in due time be understood as having played an important role in the learning curve of aircraft design. The idea that deadly catastrophes can be prevented is too optimistic.
(ii) Rather than a focus on which redesign of the B737 Max provides the simplest way out of these difficulties, the essential question is: in what way are these problems informative about weaknesses of the DO178c software engineering standards (see e.g. [35] ).
(iii) Software engineering may need to take more responsibility of that rationale of requirements and specifications. The focus of DO178c on testing protocols may distract from the promised requirements capture and management at higher levels of system design. Clearly no amount of classical software testing could have prevented the MCAS requirements from being insufficiently flexible to deal with that variation of in-flight problems that may occur, without a meta criterion for finding the failure modes 6 .
END PROMISE Promise 5.2 (Metapromise of B737 maturity.)
The Authors promise to Public:
Implicit promises, from Boeing management and Staff were made to Airlines and Pilots concerning the B737:
(i) The B737 NG is a fully mature design with a very good safety track record. It constitutes the current endpoint of the most successful development line of commercial jetliners. The B737 constitutes the pinnacle of airframe reliability.
(ii) Just as the A320 had to be adapted to new engines, a development process which Airbus has carried out in recent years, the B737 deserved for a new engine option, while using the very successful B737 (NG) airframe.
(iii) All safety systems inside the B737 have been developed into full maturity, and have proven to work well in countless circumstances, and can therefore be relied upon when adapting the design.
END PROMISE
Note that this latter promise is a promise about another set of promises. These have been inferred by us, and the proposed promisers might not have made these exactly as stated. Promising on behalf of other agents is a common phenomenon, but it may be flagged in PT as a violation. Agents cannot make promises on behalf of other agents, as they are not in possession of their private knowledge or capabilities. Readers may take this into account in such instances of public discourse. Some further observations:
Promise 5.3 (The manual trim wheel as an emerging risk factor.)
Authors to Public:
PROMISE BODY:
(i) Boeing management and engineers have failed to notice that during the years of development the trim wheel has become a less understood part of the B737 design, mainly because the problem it is supposed to solve, viz. a stabilizer runaway, has become so rare due to advances in motorized control technology technology for movable parts of wings and rudders.
(ii) Upon the introduction of MCAS, a novel scenario for a problem which is similar to but not identical to a classical stabilizer runaway, has arisen-but that went somehow unnoticed.
(iii) It was not recognized, in time, that the stabilizer trim wheel for the B737 Max may no longer be the reliable solution to stabilizer problems which it used to be in the past. The impeccable safety record of parts of the B737 NG could not be extended to the new design for this particular part of the B737 flight control technology, as the agent designs had different capabilities.
(iv) Even in the absence of MCAS there were grounds to re-evaluate the functionality of the manual stabilizer trim wheel: which scenario's for a stabilizer runaway exist, and is the manual use of the trim wheel a sufficiently reliable option for solving the problems in these scenario's. In other words: for which problem scenarios are the trim wheel to be considered a backup option, and is it sufficiently usable in those cases? This question must be understood in the context of currently fashionable B737 Pilot training traditions and in the context of Pilot practice and experience as in existence today.
END PROMISE
Many remarks are made on many websites on the functionality, the use, and the various design options for trim control. Obtaining an overview of this topic is not so easy (see, for instance [36] ). In some airplane designs the FBW (fly by wire) system takes care of stabilizer trim, except perhaps just before takeoff.
Promise 5.4 (MCAS functionality: a conceptual problem)
PROMISE BODY:
Explaining what MCAS promised to deliver in the first place is so difficult that we have found no single text which explains in any detail how that may work? 7 The best approximation we can provide is the following:
(i) During flight with flaps down and manual control (using the yoke buttons for stabilizer trimming) it may be the case that the aircraft operates in an angle of attack at which the pilot (having the B737 NG in mind) would expect the yoke to require more effort to keep in place. By activating the stabilizer trim MCAS the creates an episode in which operation of the motor moving the jackscrew has as aside effect that the pilot experiences more counterforce on the yoke, thereby experiencing what would be felt inside a B737 when operating at that same AOA. (ii) This side effect makes the pilot experience similar to what would be experienced in a B737 NG in corresponding conditions. (ii) As a second effect of MCAS activation the stabilizer is trimmed and the aircraft is made to turn nose-down, which may be supposed to reduce the angle of attack more quickly then the pilot would achieved by reacting as used in a B737: choosing between or combining elevator up, and additional stabilizer trim. (iii) We found no explanation for why MCAS is only supposed to be active when auto-pilot is off and flaps are down. We assume that, in auto-pilot mode, there is no need to make sure that pilot experience is the same as when operating a B737. In other words: the autopilot must deal with the same aerodynamic conditions and anomalies, which turns out to be entirely possible, and for that there is no need to introduce drastic 'external' interventions of stabilizer trimming in excess of what the auto-pilot as inherited from the B737 NG design would do.
END PROMISE

The role of transparency
In a perfect world there would be perfect information-but, in most cases, we have only partial information. Without perfect information, logical reasoning is almost impotent, but a reasoning based on promises can offer plausible outcomes that may be assessed on the basis of any observer's context. Clearly, the more information one has about the interior workings of agents, the easier it is to assess their promised claims. We mention only, only briefly and in passing, the contemporary tendency to 'openness' to public scrutiny, especially in the software world. The so-called Open Source Software movement is one example where transparency has been claimed to lead to quality improvements, by virtue of having 'many eyes' look over the details. There is no such openness in flight systems, so we are reduced to trusting low resolution promises and making inferences about their veracity. The freedom to report (or transparency) of the press, who report issues, is another case where onlookers have to rely on the fidelity of the intermediaries who bring us the information. Promise Theory makes it clear that one has no a priori reason to trust relayed information, as it can be distorted intentionally or unintentionally. A certain level of openness therefore builds trust. Unfortunately, neither transparency nor 'many eyes' are a guarantee of truth or even of intent to act in good faith. We know that agents can be deceived, even with the best of intentions, and that saboteurs can intentionally seek to deceive. It would be interesting to study the role of transparency, and minimum information requirements, in determining successful models for forensic investigation. That goes far beyond our goals here.
Concluding remarks
The litany of promises above describes a public discussion about the crash episodes of the Boeing 737 Max. This is to be distinguished from a technical analysis based on privileged information about the design. As such, our discussion is more in line with what might be discussed in a court of law than in a technical fault-finding analysis-it involves some hearsay and some innuendo, as is the case in all public assessments. The relationship between these two viewpoints is not always acknowledged, but seems to be relevant.
We have laid out the assessable viewpoints of the various agents, with the sources and recipients labelled clearly. From this, readers can assess the intentions, each from their own perspectives-this is one of the values of a Promise Theory approach. To some extent, such public discourse inevitably becomes a matter of 'he said, she said', and this presents a challenge to onlookers. Nevertheless, it is society's responsibility to mete justice in such cases, so we must take on that challenge.
Promises and impositions also encompass threats as a special case (see [38] ). In the context of the B737 Max accidents we have noticed a remarkably prominent occurrence of threats, (quite apart from the predictable threat that relatives of victims of the accidents would sue Boeing). Indeed Southwest Airlines expressed its being unimpressed by the relevance of B737 Max specific simulator training (see [39, 40] ), and promised to claim 1 million USD per B737 Max purchased, if specific simulator training would turn out to be needed. Boeing accepted this threat and promised the payments, in the case that it would (after all, and against its original intentions) prescribe simulator training for the B737 Max [41] . With aircraft getting more complex, providing extensive simulator training for large numbers of pilots could be a positive side-effect, and might become a form of system testing, which is likely to become more relevant and expensive. The promise of automation is normally that it reduces costs, or improves the human condition. In this case, a half-hearted attempt at automation seems to have backfired.
From our superficial presentation, constrained by brevity, the benefits of PT might not be wholly apparent, and may strike the reader as just another approach to informal logic. That may be true, but rather than a focus on evidence and truth PT suggest a focus on the dynamics of trust and the impact which promising has on the latter. A promise body may just as well be a lie (see [42] ) as it may be a mathematical theorem. One may reject our use of the word promise in which case we refer to [43] for the idea that a "valid" PT may allow some deviation of the common understanding of its keywords in order to arrive at so-called "good concepts". For a justification of the terminology and its use we refer to [14] and the references cited therein, as well as to [44, 45] .
We have not discussed assessments of promises which have not been kept. In an early stage Boeing pointed at pilot errors as explanatory for the incidents (which is the default strategy for blame in most accidents), and such remarks may be construed as a promise which has not been kept and which invites a decrease in many observers' trust in Boeing. In a later stage the Boeing CEO stated that Boeing designers did not miss any details (or fail to spot gaps) in their designs; this may construed as a promise that is probably not going to be kept. Benno Baksteen's comments above, rendered as our promise 3.9 are of interest in this regard. Baksteen has been a (very) public representative of pilots in The Netherlands for many years. He took sides with Boeing engineers and thereby unavoidably against the (now dead) pilot teams in his initial reaction. This demonstrated a remarkable 'reverse default loyalty' to his constituents. Perhaps this indicates the formidable reputation of safety for the B737 design line, and reinforces promise 5.2 item (i).
We maintain that MCAS is a proprietary (and closed source) software component, which implements an algorithm, the MCAS algorithm to which the DO178c standard has been applied to obtain the software component from a proposed description of the algorithm. To the general public, this might seem straightforward. The notion of an algorithm is somewhat ambiguous, however, and many different definitions have been given. We understand an algorithm to be a series of steps for solving a class of problems, which can be documented as a finite sequence of instructions. This definition is consistent with definitions as given in [46, 47] , but it provides some additional detail 8 . Without interior details of the design process, these promises are rather meaningless-which also renders the notion of design standards somewhat meaningless, without a formal certificate of compliance. Importantly, in the current popular use of the word, 'algorithm' refers to a software component in such a manner that the component can be made the subject of public debate. In other words by speaking of an algorithm one can make reference to a certain software component without claiming to know or to understand its technical details. In this way the ubiquitous use of 'algorithm' deviates from its conventional use in computer science where, in practice, algorithm invariably refers to a fairly detailed pseudo-code which can be turned in a straightforward manner into a computer language (e.g. Python), or into whatever general purpose program notation one may prefer. The use of the term algorithm, in the public debate, is more vague however, and the reader is expected to be aware of that state of affairs. In the case of aircraft control, and in particular also in the case of FBW (fly by wire) technology it is common to speak of flight laws as the underlying concepts from which software components are being derived. It seems appropriate to use 'flight control algorithm' as an alternative for 'flight laws' when discussing software components such as MCAS in the public domain.
A more thorough approach to mapping out the roles of all involved agents, their capabilities, and their resulting fidelity in keeping all their design promises as part of a total system is one possible future use for Promise Theory's simple methodology. What exists today seems muddled in checklist semantics without a clear integrated picture of the system on all scales. The deliberations, presented here, surrounding MCAS might also profit from contact with the larger discussion of Meaningful Human Control (see e.g. [15] and [17] ), which has become prominent in the theory of (semi)autonomous systems, including weapons as well as in the theory and practice of (semi)autonomous driving.
In closing, we note that assessments rooted in personal ideology cannot easily be avoided in public discourse-not merely by making use of Promise Theory. We have adopted the viewpoint that promise 3.3 made from Boeing (that MCAS is not an anti-stall system) is central to our considerations, and this is crucial. Were Boeing to admit that this promise cannot be kept-and therefore was not kept, a significant loss of trust in Boeing could result, and a consequential loss of trust in the future of the B737 so large that it might in fact bring down the whole B737 Max project. Portraying MCAS as an anti-stall system by default, as in many contributions to the subject (see, for example, [49] , and in the otherwise outstandingly informative [23] ), runs against the substance of promise 3.3. Reference [50] proposes speaking of 'association' if two notions are identified at some stage, and may be unidentified at a later stage. Viewing MCAS as an anti-stall system may be considered such a temporary association, to be disassociated if evidence arises that MCAS is not an anti-stall system. However, there is a key difference between the intent to behave in a certain way and an emergent and effective behaviour that seems to do the trick in the moment. Promise Theoretically we should likely oppose the validity of emergence, because public safety and legal assurances are supposed to be based on good intent. We consider promise 3.3 to be crucial in the analysis of the Boeing 737 Max accidents.
Finally, in [51] it is argued that the certification process, conducted by the FAA is in its current form, is unable to detect some structural risks and that an overhaul of the certification system is needed in such a manner as to be more focused on risk analysis. Without further comment, we add that we do not believe this to be the case: a checklist style certification process, which merely enumerates promises at the same level, might well have discovered a few more relevant weaknesses of the MCAS software component (including software certification promise lists), but more likely the current certification methods need a more systematic incorporation into all levels of engineering-including the relatively new software development process.
